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Abstract 
Both analysis of international trade and the knowledge resource theory of the firm im-
ply that language skills should play a vital role in exporting. This may be apparent to 
large multinationals with sites in many different linguistic locations, but we show it is 
less obvious to smaller companies. With data on the language used by each of a large 
sample of European small and medium sized enterprises in their export markets we test 
and estimate the effects of language assets on language performance in export markets 
and on export sales. Controlling for the possibility that language skills may be acquired 
by exporting, we find a very substantial export return to linguistic expertise, indicative 
of unexploited gains from investment in languages. There is also evidence of greater 
under-investment in language skills in English-speaking Europe. 
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Firm-Level Evidence for the Language Investment Effect on SME Exporters 
 
Only a minority of firms export and of these most only serve a few foreign markets, 
selling mainly to domestic customers (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Eaton et al., 2004; 
Bernard et al., 2007; Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007). The smaller the company the less 
likely it is to export (EC 2011 Table 1). Underpinning these characteristics, it has long 
been noted that lack of information, risks, and costly procedures have especially been 
barriers to exporting and reasons for restricted export performance (e.g. Verhoeven 
1988).  
Smaller businesses are disproportionately affected by the costs of entering foreign mar-
kets; such costs not only include conforming to foreign regulations but language and 
cultural difficulties as well (USITC 2010 6-2. 6-8). Consistent with this observation, an 
OECD/APEC international study found that a majority of smaller firms rated barriers 
related to internal capabilities and access as more significant obstacles to international-
isation than those to do with the business environment (Fliess and Busquets, 2006). 
Among the most important barriers for such companies were identifying foreign busi-
ness opportunities and limited information to locate/analyse markets (OECD 2009; EC 
2011 Fig 37). 
These obstructions are likely to stem significantly from cultural and linguistic differ-
ences. Unlike many other trade barriers, they can be reduced by investment in learning, 
but the considerable uncertainty about foreign market opportunities may encourage a 
less than ideal commitment of resources. Without good communications trade may not 
take place. In Lazear’s (1999) model individuals are randomly matched to trade with 
each other, with the consequence that communication difficulties reduce the efficiency 
of interactions. Casella and Rauch (2003) consider a search or network view of inter-
national trade in which imperfect information about foreign countries (caused partly by 
cultural differences) acts as a barrier to trade. Information–sharing networks can help 
clear this blockage, but language learning is not modelled explicitly. Konya (2006) al-
lows that agents recognize the language investments of their trading partners – gener-
ally by reducing their own. He derives an expression for under-investment in learning.  
Communication and therefore trade can occur as long as one party learns the language 
of the other. Church and King (1993) propose that the collectively efficient language 
learning solution is for the smaller language group to learn the language of the larger 
group. This maximises the excess of communication benefits over learning costs. They 
contend that communication benefits are the same whichever group becomes bilingual, 
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and the costs are lowest if the fewest possible acquire the extra language skills. The 
language learning decision is determined by specialization in Choi’s (2002) model. He 
finds that countries specialise in learning when their wages are low, except for small 
open economies. 
The large trade boost from a common official language shown in bilateral aggregate 
international trade studies indicate that language acquisition matters a great deal. Not 
sharing a common language is a significant barrier to trade (Frankel and Rose 2002; 
Anderson and van Wincoop 2004; Helpman et al. 2009; Hutchinson 2002; Melitz 2002, 
2008). Greater linguistic difference from English reduces an economy’s trade with the 
US, controlling for migrants and networks (Hutchinson 2005). Conversely Ku and 
Zussman (2010) show that the ability to communicate in English has a strong effect in 
promoting trade across the world. 
 Estimates of the trade barrier of language for smaller businesses based on such aggre-
gate national trade analysis could be too low. Generally big businesses are more likely 
than nationally confined SMEs to be sensitive to the linguistic needs of trade, by virtue 
of their multiple locations and multi-linguistic staff, as well as their greater resources 
(Barner-Rasmussen and Björkman 2005; Buckley et al 2005). Large multinational com-
panies may choose to communicate across borders in the language of their headquarters 
country, as Siemens insisted on German. But even for large businesses there will be 
pressures to use the language native to the majority of participants in transactions (Loos 
2007).  
Disaggregated studies of smaller enterprises are therefore valuable for understanding 
the contribution of investment in language skills to export performance. The present 
paper undertakes such an exercise. Because of the distinctive international role of Eng-
lish language, there is a special interest in the consequences for (here European) An-
glophone small and medium size enterprise (SME) export performance. Section 1 de-
rives hypotheses from considering how language investment fits into a resource-based 
theory of the firm and the conditions that give rise to under-investment. Section 2 dis-
cusses the EC language and exporting data set. Section 3 explains the analytical ap-
proach to testing the hypotheses and estimating the effects. Section 4 presents the re-
sults, while the concluding Section 5 discusses the implications of the estimates ob-
tained.  
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1. LANGUAGE AS A KNOWLEDGE RESOURCE 
A resource-based view of the firm (Wernerfeld 1984; Conner and Pralahad 1996; 
Westhead et al 2001; Dhanaraj and Beamish 2003) provides a partial framework to un-
derstand the contribution of languages to exporting and to formulate hypotheses. The 
distinctive ways in which a business utilises and acquires knowledge influence the ca-
pabilities that determine its competitive position (Makadok 2001; Grant 2003). Dy-
namic capabilities (Tallman 2003; Helfat et al 2007), the capacity of a firm to create, 
extend or modify its resource base, are the key to exporting, for most companies are not 
‘born global’. Firms that move into exporting or increase their export propensity are 
exhibiting dynamic capabilities; their growth potential is high because of their capabil-
ities, as demonstrated by their exporting. Enterprises reporting product or service qual-
ity exhibited a higher propensity to export, reflecting dynamic capabilities in the con-
tinual upgrading of products (Westhead et al 2004). The centrality of knowledge to this 
process is supported by evidence about ‘born global’ firms and accelerated internation-
alising enterprises, most of which tend to rely on critical knowledge assets or belong to 
the knowledge-based and knowledge-intensive sectors (Harris and Li, 2005). Compet-
itive advantage turns on knowledge resources, intangible assets. 
To the extent that knowledge is ‘tacit’ rather than codified, it is embedded in the human 
capital of the firm’s employees. Utilisation of this knowledge can be represented by the 
theory of the market–making entrepreneur (Casson 2003 pp99–100). The entrepreneur 
is one who overcomes deficiencies in the acquisition and processing of information. 
Dynamic capabilities of the firm are a form of either personal or institutional entrepre-
neurship. Knowledge of foreign markets is a component of these capabilities, an ele-
ment of the firm’s resource base, and language skills are often essential for acquiring 
information about opportunities and cultural constraints in other countries (Johanson 
and Vahlne 1977). Linguistic ability is a major stimulus for the positive use of export 
information (Williams and Chaston 2004). Experience of living and/or working over-
seas significantly affects both information–gathering and decision–making by export 
managers and, in foreign language markets, requires linguistic skills. 
Without this experience it would be difficult to judge what opportunities are available; 
inadequate investment in languages could lose firms profitable opportunities. Adoption 
of a lingua franca is not necessarily a substitute; Henderson (2005) found that when 
English was the working language of multilingual management teams, members were 
vulnerable to miscommunication which damaged trust building. Nonetheless limited 
opportunities for specialisation in smaller firms and lack of understanding about com-
munication failures explain why SMEs especially may adopt a lingua franca and suffer 
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from deficient language skills. They do not know what they would know if they had 
these skills, though they might suspect some of it (Peel and Eckhart 1993; Crick 1999). 
The consequential varying extents of underinvestment in languages then suggests the 
hypothesis that  
H1 firms with more language skills will show a more buoyant export performance. 
In order to elucidate this link, it is desirable to subdivide the hypothesis so as to distin-
guish between the exercise of linguistic skills in export markets and the resources and 
capabilities that give rise to their effective use.  
H1a Enterprises with more investment in language assets will achieve better language 
outcomes in export markets. 
H1b Better language performance in export markets increases export intensity. 
The knowledge resource theory implies that language assets that are not in-house 
sources of information, and therefore not integrated with decision taking, will be less 
effective. So external agents and outside translators as means of addressing foreign 
markets with different languages are likely to expand export sales and profits by less 
than employees, especially export managers, well trained both in languages and in the 
firm’s distinctive advantages.  
H1c Arms-length language assets will be less effective in enhancing exports than those 
closely integrated with the firms activities. 
Supplementing the knowledge resource approach, the network effect of languages 
(Church and King 1993) at first sight implies that in contrast to continental European 
enterprises, Anglophone firms typically may not need to invest in languages. As mem-
bers of the largest economic group measured by spending power (thanks to the United 
States) the English-speaking nations have an incentive not to acquire language skills; 
the payoffs to smaller linguistic groupings from learning English are greater than those 
to the Anglophone bloc. This means that perhaps 
H2a Anglophone firms invest less in language skills than the rest of Europe  
If they did invest as much they would have a competitive advantage in exporting be-
cause of the role of English as a lingua franca. But even so the ‘socially optimum’ 
solution may not be achieved. At the individual level there is a communication network 
externality with languages. If one person or firm invests in a language skill so that they 
can in principle communicate with all members of the language group, they confer a 
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benefit upon all these other members of the group in the sense that there is now a greater 
chance of discovering worthwhile trading opportunities for all of them. Yet only the 
language learner bears the cost of opening up these prospects. In deciding whether it is 
worth investing in the language skill, the individual will only take into account their 
own prospective gains from trade, not those of the potential trading partners. So there 
will be cases where language investment is not undertaken because the learner does not 
obtain the full returns, which would warrant the acquisition of the language skill.  
This externality is typically exacerbated by strategic behaviour; if a large language 
group knows a small language group will undertake the investment in learning to com-
municate, they will reduce their own efforts (Konya 2006). In Konya’s model of stra-
tegic language investment both large and small ‘countries’ will under-invest for this 
reason (Appendix 1), but it can be shown that at the level of language costs in relation 
to total trade costs that actually prevail, the under-investment by the large ‘country’ will 
be proportionately much greater. Moreover in this model only two linguistic groups are 
assumed. With several small ‘countries’ and one large, there is a stronger incentive for 
each small ‘country’ to learn the language of the large than the language of another 
small ‘country’. This may trigger even greater under-investment in language by the 
large economic group, which for present purposes are the Anglophones1.  
Firms’ specific knowledge of their own products will exacerbate this under-investment 
because of complementarities with language skills. If the barriers of language were 
completely eliminated there would be trades that members of the larger group would 
want to initiate because of their distinctive knowledge, but that would not occur if it 
was up to members of the smaller group to take action. Since members of the smaller 
group do not know about such opportunities, their calculation of how much to invest in 
linguistic skills will be biased downwards. Where members of the larger group do have 
such distinctive knowledge - and as discussed above this is a critical element in a firms’ 
competitive advantage - it is in their interest to invest in the language of the smaller 
group. But they may be deterred by recognising the strong incentives for small linguis-
tic groups to learn their language, missing out on trading opportunities with them. 
Ignorance of the payoff to language skills and investment may therefore be particularly 
marked among Anglophone exporting firms mistakenly relying on the supposed uni-
versal knowledge of English language in foreign markets. If the Anglophone firms do 
not underestimate their optimum investment in languages because of their privileged 
position we would find that;  
                                                 
1
 Anglophone countries accounted for at least one quarter of world trade in 1990 and more than one 
fifth in 2012. 
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H2b Anglophone SMEs will show similar payoffs to language investment as those of 
other European countries. 
Even though they invest less in languages, Anglophone firms will achieve similar ex-
port performances and the productivity of language investments by Anglophone firms 
will be similar to that of non-Anglophones, if H2b holds. 
Before testing these hypotheses we should note that most firm-level studies of exports 
have not been concerned to quantify the impact of language skills. But some findings 
have been obtained as a by-product of the pursuit of other objectives. Research usually 
investigates only single countries and so comparative evidence of the type required by 
H2 is not available. It also typically lacks the detail to test H1a–H1c.  
For H1 there are more studies available, though some of these provide only indirect 
evidence, as does the descriptive World Bank research that observed the common lan-
guage effect on Columbian SME exports (Berry and Escandon 1994) (the well-re-
searched counterpart in aggregated studies of bilateral international trade was noted in 
the introduction). At the case study level language skills enhance exporting for Spanish 
SMEs (Stoian and Rialp-Criado, 2010). A logit analysis of Turkish exporter and non-
exporter SMEs establishes that lack of language skills reduces export chances 
(Demirbas 2009). Crick et al’s (2000) factor analysis of British agricultural exporters 
found language skills facilitated market access significantly (Table 2). But none of these 
elucidates the process by which languages influence exports, as required by the above 
hypotheses. 
 
2. THE EC ELAN SURVEY OF SME EXPORTS AND LANGUAGE SKILLS 
The hypotheses are tested with the Elan survey of European exporting small and me-
dium enterprises undertaken for the European Commission (Hagen et al 2006)2. This is 
the most ambitious survey of language use by business in that almost all European 
countries were included and up to 100 SMEs (with fewer than 250 employees) were 
sampled in each country. The Elan surveyors note that the sample was stratified for each 
country to match the national export profile as closely as possible. The export profile 
was identified as the pattern of trade destinations and sectors by country for exports of 
goods and services based on official trade figures. A cross-section of company sizes 
was selected that also reflected national rather than regional patterns. In one respect the 
                                                 
2
 The use of this data set is licensed by Semantica Ltd. 1.7 percent of the sample indicated that they 
were not exporting at the time of the survey but they may be assumed to have formerly exported and/or 
sbsjf2sbwere about to begin or resume exporting. 
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sample cannot be representative – because the firms are SME exporters and most SMEs 
in all countries do not export. Almost two thirds of the sampled firms were in manufac-
turing, all employed fewer than 250 persons, just under one fifth were subsidiaries and 
the mean proportion of turnover exported was 43 percent. 60 percent of these SME 
exporters had adapted their website for foreign markets and the average national trade–
GDP ratio for the sample was 105 percent (Appendix 2 Table A4). 
Language questions employed in the analysis fall into three groups; reasons for lan-
guage investments, the investments themselves and language performance or outcomes. 
The ‘reasons’ questions are: 
 ‘Strategy’. In order to deal with customers abroad does your company have a 
formal language strategy?  ‘Agents’. Have you ever used local agents and/or distributors who speak your 
own native language in your foreign markets?  ‘Trans’. Have you ever employed external translators/interpreters for foreign 
trade? 
Obviously a firm with a language strategy has a reason to invest in language skills. But 
a firm that employs agents for foreign sales is likely to do so to avoid the expense of 
investing in languages and the same is true of the employment of external translators/in-
terpreters. 
The self-evident investment questions are: 
 ‘Skills’. Have you acquired staff with specific language skills due to export 
needs?  ‘Empnat’. Have you ever employed native speakers full time in your company 
who support your foreign trade?  ‘Training’ Has your company undertaken foreign language training of staff? 
The language performance or outcome questions are: 
 ‘Match’ ‘Does the language used in the principal foreign market match the prin-
cipal language used there?’  ‘Match_NonEng’ ‘Does the language other than English used in the principal 
foreign market matches principal language used?’  
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 ‘Eng’ ‘Does the enterprise use English in its non-English speaking the  principal 
foreign market?’3  
An example of ‘Match_NonEng’ would be a UK exporter whose principal market was 
Germany using German for the selling in that market (but so would a German, or at 
least a Bavarian, selling to Austria using German).  
The businesses in the present Elan sample were based in 29 European4 countries. Their 
principal foreign markets were Germany for 17.1 percent of firms, UK for 10.6 percent, 
France for 9.5 percent and Russia for 5.9 percent (Appendix Table A1). Outside Europe 
the most common primary market was the US (for 6.4 percent). The proportion of SMEs 
with any other principal foreign market outside Europe was extremely small. The lan-
guage used in the main market was overwhelmingly English (48 percent of companies) 
(Appendix Table A2). Then the ordering follows that of the markets; German 15 percent, 
French 9 percent and Russian 8 percent. 
Almost half of the European sample have language strategies, employee language train-
ing and have acquired staff with specific language skills for export purposes (Table 1). 
By contrast, consistent with the results for English functioning as a world language, 
sampled SMEs from Anglophone European countries invest in language skills very dif-
ferently from the European average. British firms for instance are only broadly compa-
rable with Europe as whole in their employment of agents5 (Table 1). In most other 
respects they do not compare at all with those of Europe. The proportions of enterprises 
claiming language skills, language strategies and using translators in Europe as a whole 
are much more than double those in the UK sample. A slightly higher proportion of 
Irish SMEs than British invested in language training for employees and claimed lan-
guage skills – compare the Eurobarometer (2005) survey of language skills– but those 
that used translators and agents or employ foreign nationals for their language abilities 
are very much rarer. Maltese businesses show the same language characteristics as those 
of Britain and Ireland, except that a broadly similar proportion as the European average 
claims to have a language strategy for their foreign markets6. The 78 percent of the UK 
SMEs that use English in their main overseas market is matched by the Irish and Mal-
tese businesses. In short, from table 1 it is apparent that Anglophone businesses in the 
                                                 
3
 The great majority of firms in the sample are not Anglophone and therefore using English for selling 
in non-Anglophone markets is the consequence of investment in an ‘open circuit’ language or lingua 
franca. As we acknowledge with later specifications, for Anglophones of course no linguistic invest-
ment is needed for this purpose. 
4
 Including Turkey but excluding Slovenia. 
5
 A historical allegation is that agencies insulate exporters from market information, with adverse ef-
fects on competitiveness. 
6
 Malta is classified as Anglophone because English is one of the two official languages. 
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sample probably rely on everyone else using English. Their lack of language investment 
is consistent with H2a.  
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
This lower Anglophone demand for language services might simply reflect a lower need 
relative to the continent. But Anglophone firms focus more strongly on English-speak-
ing customers (35 percent of UK SMEs have English speaking principal foreign mar-
kets) than other European countries (19 percent) – the common language effect (Table 
2). More than two thirds of sampled Irish SMEs, and two fifths of the Maltese sample, 
supply the UK as their most important foreign market. So the Irish and Maltese depend-
ence on English language for selling at first sight then is more justified than the British 
SMEs that are much more liable to employ English in non-Anglophone markets. On 
the one hand Anglophone enterprises might achieve higher sales were they less fo-
cussed on English speaking markets because of their lack of language skills. On the 
other, apparently non-mother tongue English European firms share the practice of using 
English for selling, according to Table 2, so why should not the Anglophones?  
<TABLE 2 HERE> 
 
3. TESTS AND ESTIMATION 
In order to establish whether this extensive Anglophone use of English language in ex-
port markets is warranted (an implication of H2b), to test the hypotheses 1a-1c and to 
estimate the impact of language skills on enterprise performance, we need an empirical 
model to control for influences upon exporting that might otherwise be conflated with 
language investment.  
Ideally language assets would be employed up to the point where the extra revenue they 
contribute through greater export sales was balanced by their extra costs. These assets 
would both improve sales in foreign language markets and encourage switches away 
from crowded and less profitable common language markets to foreign language desti-
nations. They would increase export sales without necessarily detracting from domestic 
sales through a production function based on firm-specific knowledge assets. The pro-
duction function in turn would create a derived demand for language assets. Although 
we do not know the price of the language investments, if their implied marginal produc-
tivity is very high relative to likely prices or costs then there is prima facie evidence of 
under-investment. 
11 
 
We embed our three types of language variables in a general model with a recursive 
structure, where ܨሺ. ሻ and ܩሺ. ሻ are link functions. Reasons for investing or not invest-
ing in languages determine actual investment, which in turn results in language perfor-
mance, being able to speak the language of the chosen market with varying degrees of 
fluency. The principal interest lies in the contribution of language performance, or in-
vestments, or both, to exports. There are two possible routes by which inadequate lan-
guage investment may make a difference to exporters. One is crowding them into com-
mon language markets where they cannot sell as much as if they could range equally 
freely across the world. The other is failing to communicate effectively in foreign mar-
kets and thereby exporting less to each market. Difficulties in measuring language per-
formance render expedient allowing for this link to be implicit in a measured relation-
ship simply between exports and language investment (as we do in three of the four 
specifications of Table 4)7. ��݊�ݑ���� is a vector of language outcomes or investments pertinent to export perfor-
mance for the ith enterprise: ��݊�ݑ���� =  ܨሺߙ′��ሻ +  ��ଵ   (1) ܧ�݌݋ݎݐݏ� = ܩሺ ߚ′��݊�ݑ����  +  ߛ′��ሻ  + ��ଶ  (2) 
In equation (2), �� is the vector of non-language outcome or investment determinants 
of ‘exports’, including ‘Anglophone’, market and sector dummies, ‘subsidiary’ status 
and national trade openness, while ߛ is the coefficient vector of ��. Some elements of �� (equation 1), the determinants of language skills, outcomes and capacities, may be 
included in �� (trade openness, subsidiary). Language investment in employing native 
speakers, other persons with special language skills and providing language training for 
personnel, gives rise to language outcomes or performance, here measured by ‘match’, 
matching the language of the principal export market for selling purposes. Because the 
quality of the language used in matching languages in foreign market, or in using a third 
language such as English for communication, is likely to be at least as important as the 
fact of matching, we include language investment variables in the export equation as 
well. The specifications of equations 1 and 2 are detailed in Table 3. 
<TABLE 3 HERE> 
Measuring the dependent variable for export performance as the ratio of exports to turn-
over creates the possibility that more investment in languages might merely switch from 
                                                 
7
 One limitation of the language performance matching variable is that, being restricted to firms’ princi-
pal market, it fails to take full account of language performance by enterprises selling in several differ-
ent language markets. 
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more profitable home markets to less profitable foreign markets. We control for this 
possibility by including domestic sales (logged, ‘ldom’) as an independent variable and 
keeping the ratio dependent variable. If the language coefficient is positive, holding 
constant domestic turnover, then language investment boosts exports without reducing 
domestic sales.  
Other control variables include a measure of establishment size, which Harris and Li 
(2009) have shown is a fundamental determinant of exporting. We measure size with a 
five category employment variable (‘empl’). Since turnover is also included in the em-
pirical model as well, the effects of firm-level labour productivity on export intensity is 
be largely controlled as well. 
National trade openness (‘tradegdp’ Appendix Table A3) is incorporated because a typ-
ical SME of a smaller economy, such as Belgium, that trades 165 percent of its output 
is probably, like the economy in which it is located, more export–intensive than a firm 
based in a country, such as the UK, that trades only 55 percent. But openness is likely 
to stem primarily from the size and prosperity of the economy, rather than from invest-
ment in language human assets. We are able to employ the openness variable because 
we use random country effects after testing whether these results were consistent with 
fixed country effects estimates8. 
Another variable that might influence a company’s exports independently of language 
skills is whether the business is a subsidiary (‘sub’). A subsidiary may be able to draw 
upon more knowledge resources, including language skills, than other similar sized in-
dependent companies and enhance export sales accordingly. Supplying larger markets 
(such as Germany, ‘DEmkt’) may also raise a firm’s exports for a given investment in 
language skills, as might the sector in which the business operates9. 
If the disturbance terms �ଵ and �ଶ are correlated, then observed associations between 
language skills and outcomes on the one hand and exports on the other could be mis-
leading. This would occur for instance when unobserved more energetic management 
is more likely to engage in language investment and language matching in export mar-
kets, as well as to cultivate export markets more effectively. Then the associations 
would not only reflect the impact of language variables on exports; the language effect 
coefficient would not be identified. Similarly the possibility that exporting firms are 
more likely to acquire language skills in the course of exporting, rather than as a cause 
                                                 
8
 The openness variable is perfectly collinear with the country of location dummy variables. 
9
 We distinguish five sectors: agriculture and mining, manufacturing, construction, retail and whole-
sale, plus other services (in that order). Given the sample size, a larger number cannot be specified with 
meaningful statistical results while also controlling for the considerable number of other variables in 
the model. 
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of exporting, must be taken into consideration in the estimation because this also would 
bias the coefficient estimates and invalidate the hypothesis tests10. That is, instead of 
the recursive structure postulated above, it could be simultaneous, with exports appear-
ing as an explanatory variable in equation (1). In both of the above cases OLS estimates 
of the language coefficients in (2) would be upward biased. An export performance 
‘correction’ scenario generates the opposite bias; that is, when enterprises with poor 
exporting performances are attempting to remedy the problem by investing in language 
assets while already strong exporters feel no need to invest, OLS estimates are down-
ward biased.  
Using instrumental variables in the � vector of (1), in principle we can purge the lan-
guage assets of such effects, bearing in mind that weak instruments bias IV estimators 
and their standard errors. A theoretically justified (by exogeneity) set of instruments in 
the present context are variables that determine language investment but do not them-
selves influence exports. The adoption of a language strategy is a potential instrument 
because it is a reason for investing in languages. So too is whether a firm employs 
agents for foreign sales, since they are likely to do so to save on investing in languages 
within the enterprise and themselves building up contacts in those markets. Equally 
employment of external translators/interpreters is an exogenous influence, entailing a 
prior decision not to embed language skills in the enterprise.  
Versions of equation (1) allow a test of the hypothesis (H1a) that investment in various 
language resources improves the language performance/outcome – matching the lan-
guage of the principal foreign market or, for Anglophone firms matching language in 
non-English speaking principal markets, or simply having implemented language train-
ing. Equation (2) permits investigation of the hypothesis (H1b) that language outcomes 
influence export performance. The specification also lets us measure these effects. We 
must allow that the effectiveness of language matching or language training in promot-
ing exports may depend on their quality, which in turn is likely to be influenced by the 
language resources committed to the exercises. H1c, the comparative effectiveness of 
embedded language assets (the ineffectiveness of agents and/or translators), is a special 
case of H1b. 
Anglophone businesses demand fewer language skills than the rest of Europe (H2a) 
because they can tap the widely understood English language without additional invest-
                                                 
10
 If firms choose markets regardless of language skills, language matching may be a matter of loca-
tional chance, rather than systematic influence as postulated by, and testable in, a version of equation 
(1). The main concern is with a version of equation (2); given that matching does or does not take place 
for whatever reason, how is export intensity affected? 
14 
 
ment. A test of H2b with export equation (2) is whether Anglophone SMEs have a suf-
ficient advantage in exporting that compensates for their lower investment in language 
assets. A second test, utilising the principle of diminishing export returns to language 
investment, is whether estimated on the Anglophone-only sample, a larger language 
coefficient is obtained than for non-Anglophone SMEs. We can reject a version of H2b 
(a similar payoff for Anglophone SMEs from investing in language skills by training) 
if it is.  
On similar grounds, a test for an Anglophone shortfall in equation (1) is whether the 
language investment coefficient in the language ‘Matching’ equations are similar be-
tween the two groups. If acquisition of staff with language skills is equally effective for 
matching between the groups, again H2b can be rejected. Although Anglophones’ skills 
are justifiably lower when they do acquire them, if the skills are more effective at the 
margin than those of other Europeans, it is likely that they have been under-investing; 
investing more in language skills would drive down the marginal and average returns 
in the form of language matching or export intensity to continental European levels. 
 
4. RESULTS 
First we explore the data for equation (2) using random effects country panel estimation 
(Table 4). Equation 4.1 suggests that translators and agents do not increase export ratios 
(H1c), nor do SMEs of Anglophone economies achieve higher export intensities (con-
trary to H2b). Equation 4.2 indicates that the sum of the statistically significant positive 
language coefficients is 37. This implies that enterprises with all these language invest-
ments and performances would achieve an export ratio 37 percentage points higher than 
those with none of them, without reducing their domestic turnover (consistent with 
H1b)11. Increasing the coverage with equation 4.3, by dropping domestic turnover, the 
language coefficients sum to 36. Restricting the sample to non-Anglophones with do-
mestic turnover the language coefficients sum to 40 (eqn 4.4). Increasing the non-An-
glophone sample by dropping domestic turnover (eqn 4.5) the sum is 45.  
Turning to the Anglophone only sample, including turnover leaves too few cases for 
credible inferences (only 39) and inclusion or exclusion in the full sample does not 
greatly alter the language coefficient estimates. So dropping the turnover variable, the 
language matching coefficient has a negative and significant coefficient (eqn 4.6) and 
employing native speakers is not significantly different from zero. The Anglophone 
                                                 
11
 When domestic turnover was replaced by total turnover, or its log, the turnover coefficient was not 
statistically significant. 
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training coefficient is just significant at the five percent level and is large compared to 
the whole sample or to non-Anglophone equations. On the principle of diminishing 
returns this is consistent with higher export sales returns from language training in An-
glophone SMEs because there is so little of it in the present sample. The significant 
negative effect of ‘matching English’ in Anglophone equation 4.7 shows what underlies 
the ‘match’ coefficient of equation 4.6; these firms are being pushed into Anglophone 
markets by their ignorance and are performing less well as a result – apparently with 
15.8 percentage points poorer export ratios. 
<TABLE 4 HERE> 
In the preceding section we have suggested some reasons why these single equation 
estimates may be biased. Next we therefore establish the extent to which certain lan-
guage outcomes and investments are influences upon export intensity, rather than re-
sponses to it. We begin with instrumental variables estimation of equation (2), sequen-
tially estimating the response of exports to ‘training’, to ‘employing a national’, to ‘em-
ploying language skilled workers’ and to ‘matching the language in foreign markets’. 
We adopt the sequential strategy because of a shortage of credible instruments, recog-
nising that the individual language variables may also identify some of the total effect 
of the group12. Table 5 shows the instrumented individual language coefficients are very 
large – much larger than the OLS estimates13. For instance equation 5.1 indicates that 
enterprises employing native language speakers for their foreign trade experienced a 63 
percentage points higher export ratios than those that did not, holding constant domestic 
sales. One interpretation might be that employing such people is extremely expensive 
and only possible when an enterprise is highly focussed on export markets. But this 
type of argument is much less compelling for equation 5.3 where SMEs that train their 
staff in languages apparently achieve 54 percentage points higher export ratios than 
others. For all equations the language estimates are supported by instrument relevance 
confirmed by the highly significant (Kleibergen-Paap LM) ID stat, and by Hansen’s J 
statistic not rejecting the null of lack of correlation with the disturbance term. The (An-
derson-Rubin) first stage F statistics are highly significant, and greater than 10 for all 
but one of the equations of Table 5 (Staiger and Stock 1997). Even allowing for some 
                                                 
12
 Although they are not  highly correlated; 
Emp.nat.   Skills Training  
Skills 0.2434   
Training 0.0834 0.2530  
Match 0.0702 0.1152 0.0442  
13
 This finding is not affected by estimation with IV Tobit allowing for the few temporary non-export-
ers, or by random country effect panel estimation. 
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bias in the estimated mean and the variance of the 2SLS estimators, the language coef-
ficients are very large and statistically significant (accept H1b)14.  
The second clear result of Table 5 continues to be that the European Anglophone econ-
omies do not have an export advantage from speaking English that compensates for 
their much lower investment in languages, contrary to H2b. The Anglophone coefficient 
is not significantly positive at the five percent level and is significantly negative in 5.4. 
<TABLE 4 HERE> 
We now turn to language matching in export markets, equation 1 of the model, in Table 
6. Anglophone matching of non-English language (6.1) is compared with non-Anglo-
phone firms’ all language matching (6.2). The probit equations show that firms employ-
ing staff with special language skills acquired to deal with export needs (‘skills’) are 
more likely to match the language of their principal export market (H1a confirmed). 
For Anglophone SMEs (6.1) such staff raise the probability much more than for non-
Anglophones (6.2). Given the effectiveness for export intensity of language matching, 
this is evidence against H2b (similar payoffs to language investments), but the matter 
is examined further below.  
Employing foreign nationals also has a significant effect on the chances of language 
matching for non-Anglophone companies (H1a). The positive coefficient is smaller for 
the Anglophones and not significantly different from zero15. The national trade-GDP 
ratio (SMEs in more open economies) in addition boosts the likelihood of matching for 
non-Anglophones. Table 7 shows the marginal effects at means of the language invest-
ment determinants of language matching for Anglophone and non-Anglophone enter-
prises. The coefficients that are significantly different from zero sum to a larger mar-
ginal effect for Anglophones (0.45) than for non-Anglophones (0.17). This is consistent 
with diminishing returns to language investment and under-investment by Anglophone 
SMEs16. 
<TABLE 6 HERE> 
<TABLE 7 HERE> 
                                                 
14
 For the skills equation 5.2 the Stock–Yogo critical value for 5% maximal IV relative bias   is 13.91 
compared with a weak ID statistic of  19.1. For the training equation 5.3, the weak ID statistic of 13.07 
is close to the 5% maximal IV relative bias critical value of 13.9. 
15
 Merely because a language investment fails to increase the chances of language matching does not 
mean it is not effective, for it may improve the quality of the language matching of the communication. 
16
 Using the ‘Match’ dependent variable in an Anglophone probit equation yields a significant  
‘Skill’ coefficient with a marginal effect of  0.265, considerably greater than the sum of the two coeffi-
cients in the non-Anglophone equation 2 Table 6. 
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5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
The resource base theory of the firm points to firm-specific knowledge as the source of 
survival and growth potential. Especially for a stand–alone business, knowledge of for-
eign markets, and therefore export sales, are likely to be advanced by the language skills 
and foreign experience of the staff. There are stronger incentives for members of 
smaller linguistic groups to learn the language of larger groups because they are more 
likely to find profitable trades – when the groups’ per capita incomes are broadly similar. 
But the network externality and strategic interaction in language investment will prob-
ably induce all market participants to under-invest in language skills, without appropri-
ate policy intervention. Because the enterprise knows better than the public the value 
of what it has to sell, this under-investment tendency means that even for firms that are 
members of a dominant language group (here assumed to be Anglophones), it could 
well be profitable to invest in acquiring the language of smaller groups. Relying on the 
smaller group – who do not know what the firm has to sell – having learned the larger 
group language may reduce the volume of profitable trades; they will under-perform in 
exporting.  
Language effects on exports can be broken down into language investments that pro-
mote useful linguistic performance in export markets and the effects of this performance 
on export intensity. For the first relationship single equation estimates show that staff 
with special language skills acquired to deal with export needs (‘skills’) always increase 
the chances of matching the language of the principal export market (H1a). Consistent 
with a knowledge resource base theory of the firm, we find arms-length relations that 
might be used to overcome the informational difficulties of different language markets 
to be ineffective (agents, translators), especially compared with in-house language as-
sets (H1c). 
For European SMEs as a whole single equation estimates imply that the combined ef-
fect of training staff in language, acquiring staff with language skills, employing native 
language speakers and matching the sales language to the market, is to increase the ratio 
of exports to sales by 37 percent (H1b). This estimate is obtained by controlling for 
domestic turnover and therefore for the average enterprise in the sample would entail a 
very large increase in total sales. Although language assets may be costly it is unlikely 
that they are so expensive they would cancel out the profits from such an expansion. In 
this case a conclusion of under-investment in languages is warranted.  
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To eliminate the possibility that the estimated language effect is upward biased, each 
potential contributor is instrumented separately. Each yields a larger coefficient than 
the least squares total effects of the four language variables together. The three instru-
ments are chosen on grounds of their exogeneity to the language investments – they are 
reasons for the investment or lack of it – and they pass the test of instrument relevance. 
For some language variables there is evidence that the instruments are weak but not for 
‘acquiring staff with language skills’, with a coefficient indicating that such staff are 
responsible for 43 percentage point higher export/turnover ratio. The result suggests 
that the single equation coefficients might be biased downwards, rather than upwards. 
Whichever set of estimates is more plausible it must be concluded that the language 
effect on exports for SMEs is large. This inference allows us to answer Mayer and Ot-
taviano’s (2007) question at the end of their study of European firms; ‘If superstars 
dominate international markets, is there any room for global SME’s?’ There is indeed 
room for those SMEs that are prepared to invest substantially in languages. 
European Anglophone exporting smaller companies use fewer language assets than 
those elsewhere in Europe (H2a) and are far more concentrated on English-speaking 
markets. When they do invest in language training and staff with language expertise 
they obtain a much larger return in terms of exports than continental Europe – consistent 
with their under-investment (H2b). The observation that English is a world language 
does not imply that Anglophone economies need not invest in language skills– as ap-
pears to be a widespread assumption among UK SMEs in this sample. As early as the 
1890s, a keen observer bemoaned the unwillingness of British businessmen to make 
any linguistic concessions in overseas markets, thereby losing customers to the more 
accommodating foreign competitors (Gaskell 1897). We have provided evidence that 
this problem has not disappeared in the intervening century. 
The SMEs were sampled on the basis that they were exporters and so the benefits of 
language skills for improving their export performance, estimated in the present paper, 
are likely to constitute only a portion of language investment payoffs. Some estimates 
of the gains from beginning exporting are large (for example Harris and Li 2007). Lan-
guage assets and capabilities will often be helpful in this strategy as well. In any case 
the payoff in terms of greater exports from investing in language skills is substantial; 
compared with no language investments or knowledge utilisation the average European 
SME with all the effective investments and outcomes has an export intensity around 36 
percentage points greater.  
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Establishing a true private or social return to the payoffs from SME language invest-
ments requires estimates of the resources needed to take advantage of the export oppor-
tunity. Few cases are available at the national level of the costs of language investment 
– Grin (2003) appears to be unusual in estimating a figure for Switzerland. So this is a 
task that is still to be undertaken. Yet the size of the impact of language investment and 
skills on SME exports demonstrated in the present study is prima facie evidence of 
substantial net returns and probable linguistic under-investment especially among small 
and medium size enterprises of the European countries with English as the mother 
tongue. 
 
 
20 
 
References 
Anderson J E and van Wincoop E (2004) ‘Trade Costs’, Journal of Economic Litera-
ture; 42 (3): 691–751 
Barner-Rasmussen, W. and Björkman, I. (2005) Surmounting Interunit Barriers, Inter-
national Studies of Management and Organization. 35(1) 28–46. 
Bernard, A., Jensen, J.B. Redding S. and Schott, P. (2007), Firms in International 
Trade, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(3), 105–130. 
Bernard, A.B. and Jensen J.B.(1999), Exceptional Exporter Performance: Cause, Ef-
fect, or Both? Journal of International Economics, 47(1), 1–25. 
Berry A and Escandon J (1994) Colombia's Small and Medium-Size Exporters and 
Their Support Systems, The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series: 
1401 
Buckley, P. J., Carter, M. J., Clegg, J.and Hut, T.(2005) Language and Social 
Knowledge in Foreign–Knowledge Transfer to China International Studies of Man-
agement and Organization. 35 (1) 47–65 
Casella, A. and J. E. Rauch, (2003) Overcoming Informational Barriers to Interna-
tional Resource Allocation: Prices and Group Ties, Economic Journal 113 21–42. 
Casson, M (2003) The Entrepreneur: An Economic Theory, 2nd ed, Elgar: Chelten-
ham. 
Choi, E, (2002) Trade and the Adoption of a Universal Language, International Re-
view of Economics and Finance 11 265–75. 
Church, J and King, I (1993) ‘Bilingualism and Network Externalities’, Canadian 
Journal of Economics 26 2 337–345 
Conner K R and Prahalad C K (1996) A Resource-Based Theory of the Firm: 
Knowledge versus Opportunism, Organization Science Vol. 7, No. 5 pp. 477–501 
Crick, D. (1999) "An investigation into SMEs’ use of languages in their export opera-
tions", International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research, 5, 1, 19–31 
Crick, D., Chaudry, S. and Batstone, S. (2000) Revisiting the Concentration versus 
Spreading Debate As a Successful Export Growth Strategy: The Case of UK SMEs 
21 
 
Exporting Agricultural–Related Products, Entrepreneurship and Regional Develop-
ment, v. 12, iss. 1, pp. 49–67 
Demirbas, D. (2009) Political Economy of Government Programs on Export Success: 
A Logit Model for a Turkish Survey. Journal of East–West Business; Jul–Dec Vol. 15 
Issue 3/4, p316–339. 
Dhanaraj, C. and Beamish P. W. (2003). "A Resource-based Approach to the Study of 
Export Performance." Journal of Small Business Management, 41, 3 242–260 
Eaton, J., Kortum, S.and Kramarz F. (2004), Dissecting Trade: Firms, Industries, and 
Export Destinations, American Economic Review, 94(2), 150–154. 
Eurobarometer (2005) Europeans and Languages, European Commission DG Press 
and Communication 
European Commission (2005) A New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism [COM 
(2005) 596 final]  
European Commission (2011) Study on the level of internationalisation of European 
SMEs ,http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/market–access/internationalisa-
tion/index_en.htm#h2–2  
Fliess B. and Busquets C. (2006) The role of trade barriers in SME internationalisa-
tion, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 45 
Gaskell W S H (1897) Our Trade in the World in Relation to Foreign Competition 
1883–1893 cited in R J S Hoffman (1983) Great Britain and the German Trade Ri-
valry 1875–1914 New York Garland 
Grant R M (2003) ‘The knowledge-based view of the firm’ in D O Faulkner and A 
Campbell eds The Oxford Handbook of Strategy, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
Greene, W. (2011), Econometric Analysis (7th edition), Prentice Hall. 
Grin, F (2003) ‘Language Planning and Economics’, Current Issues in Language 
Planning, 4, 1, 1–66 
Hagen, S., Foreman-Peck, J, and. Davila-Philippon S (2006) ELAN: Effects on the Eu-
ropean Economy of Shortages of Foreign Language Skills in Enterprise. Brussels: Eu-
22 
 
ropean Commission. A report commissioned from CILT, the National Centre for Lan-
guages by the Directorate for Education and Culture of the European Commission and 
prepared by CILT in association with InterAct International Ltd. 
Harris, R. and Li, Q C. (2005), “Review of the Literature: The Role of International 
Trade and Investment in Business Growth and Development”, Final Report Submitted 
to the DTI, September (DTI Ref: UKTILITREV 05/01 
Harris R and Li Q C (2007) Firm level empirical study of the contribution of export-
ing to UK productivity growth , Final Report to UKTI 
Harris R and Li Q C  (2009)  “Exporting, R&D, and Absorptive Capacity in UK Es-
tablishments” Oxford Economic Papers, 61, 1, 74-103 
Hausman, J. A. (1978). "Specification Tests in Econometrics". Econometrica 46 (6): 
1251–1271. 
Helfat C E , Finfelstein S., Mithell W., Peteraf MA., Singh, H., Teece D. J., and Win-
ter S.G. (2007) Dynamic Capabilities: Understanding Strategic Change in Organiza-
tions, Oxford, Blackwell 
Helpman, E., Melitz, M J and Yeaple, S R (2004) ‘Export versus FDI with Heteroge-
neous Firms’, American Economic Review, 94, 1, pp. 300–316 
Helpman, E., Melitz, M. J., and Rubinstein, Y. (2009). ‘Estimating trade flows: trad-
ing partners and trading volumes’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 123, pp. 
441–487. 
Henderson, J. K. (2005) Language diversity in international management teams. Inter-
national Studies of Organization and Management, 35(1) 66–82. 
Hutchinson W K (2005) ‘Linguistic Distance as a Determinant of Bilateral Trade’, 
Southern Economic Journal 73(1) 1–15 
Hutchinson, W.K, (2002). ‘Does ease of communication increase trade? Commonality 
of language and bilateral trade’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, vol. 49, pp. 
544–556. 
Johanson, J. and Vahlne, J.-E. (1977). The internationalization process of the firm: A 
model of knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments. Jour-
nal of International Business Studies, 8(1): 23–
23 
 
Konya, I (2006) ‘Modeling Cultural Barriers in International Trade’ Review of Inter-
national Economics, 14, 3, 494–507 
Ku H. and Zussman A. (2010) Lingua franca: The role of English in international 
trade, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 75 250–260 
Lazear, E. P., (1999) Culture and Language, Journal of Political Economy 107 S95–
126. 
Loos, E (2007) ‘Language Policy in an Enacted World: The Organization of Linguis-
tic Diversity’ Language Problems and Language Planning 31, 1, 37–60. 
Makadok, R. (2001), Toward a Synthesis of the Resource-Based View and Dynamic–
Capability Views of Rent Creation. Strategic Management Journal; 22, (5), pp. 387–
401 
Mayer T and Ottaviano G I P (2007) The happy few: the internationalisation of Euro-
pean firms. New facts based on firm-level evidence, Bruegel Blueprint Series III 
Melitz J (2002) ‘Language and Foreign Trade’, University of Strathclyde, CREST–
INSEE, and CEPR 
Melitz, J. (2008). ‘Language and foreign trade’, European Economic Review, vol. 52, 
pp. 667–699. 
OECD (2009), “Top Barriers and Drivers to SME Internationalisation”, Report by the 
OECD Working Party on SMEs and Entrepreneurship, OECD. 
Peel, M. J. and Eckart, H. (1993) "Export and Language Barriers in the Welsh SME 
Sector", Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, Vol. 4 Iss: 1, pp.31 –
42. 
Roper, S., Du, J and Love J H., (2008) Modelling the Innovation Value Chain, Re-
search Policy, 37, 6–7, July 961–977 
Rose A K and Wincoop E van (2001) ‘National Money as a Barrier to International 
Trade: The Real Case for Currency Union’, American Economic Review 91 2 386–
390 
Staiger, D. and J.H. Stock (1997) Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak In-
struments, Econometrica, 65, 557 – 586. 
24 
 
Stoian, M-C. And Rialp-Criado, A. (2010) Analyzing Export Behavior Through Man-
agerial Characteristics and Perceptions: A Multiple Case–Based Research. Journal of 
Global Marketing, Sep/Oct, Vol. 23 Issue 4, p333–348. 
Tallman S (2003) ‘Dynamic capabilities’ in D O Faulkner and A Campbell eds The 
Oxford Handbook of Strategy, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
United States International Trade Commission, (2010) Small and Medium-Sized En-
terprises: Characteristics and Performance, Investigation No. 332–510,USITC Publi-
cation 4189 
Verhoeven, W. (1988) The Export Performance of Small and Medium-Sized Enter-
prises in the Netherlands, International Small Business Journal January vol. 6 no. 2 
20–33 
Wernerfelt, B. (1984), "A resource-based view of the firm". Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol.5, pp. 171–180 
Westhead, P. Wright, M. and Ucbasaran, D. (2004) Internationalization of private 
firms: environmental turbulence and organizational strategies and resources Entrepre-
neurship and Regional Development 16 501–522 
Westhead, P., Wright, M. and Ucbasaran, D. (2001) The internationalization of new 
and small firms: a resource-based view, Journal of Business Venturing, 16: 333–358. 
Williams, J E M and Chaston I (2004) ‘Links between the Linguistic Ability and In-
ternational Experience of Export Managers and their Export Marketing Intelligence 
Behaviour’, International Small Business Journal 22, 5, 463–486  
25 
 
TEXT TABLES 
 
Table 1 Percentages of Enterprises with Language Investments and Planning  
(Elan Sample) 
 Skills Strat-egy 
Employ na-
tive speaker 
External 
Transla-
tors 
Agents Training 
Whole Europe 
sample 43.6 48.6 20.9 42.8 30.3 48.4 
UK 15.0 3.1 15.8 15.5 29.3 16.0 
Ireland Republic 21.5 1.3 2.6 3.8 9.0 19.2 
Malta 10.8 37.8 5.4 18.9 5.4 11.1 
 
 
Table 2 Language Use and Principal Foreign Market 
 
% SMEs with most 
common principal 
foreign market 
% SME with most com-
mon used language in 
principal foreign market 
% SMEs with An-
glophone principal 
foreign market 
Europe  
(full sample) Germany 17% English 48% 19% 
UK France 33% English 78% 35% 
Ireland UK 68% English 76% 72% 
Malta UK 39% English 79% 79% 
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Table 3 Specifications for Equations 1 and 2 
Language X variables Z variables 
Investment: 
employ nationals, 
skills, 
training 
trade openness, 
subsidiary status, 
strategy, 
agent, 
external translators 
web modification 
size/employment 
turnover 
Anglophone, 
market and sector 
dummies, 
subsidiary status 
trade openness 
Performance: 
language matching 
matching non-Eng-
lish language of mar-
ket 
English used in non-
Anglophone markets 
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Table 4 Random Effects Panel Estimation of Export/Turnover Equations 
Dep. Var. (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) (4.7) 
Export Ratio All All All Non-Anglo-phone 
Non-Anglo-
phone Anglophone Anglophone 
empnat 6.312** 6.704** 5.944*** 6.991*** 6.730*** 0.137 3.804 
 
(3.02) (3.21) (3.58) (3.36) (3.77) (0.02) (0.64)    
skills 5.340*** 5.505*** 7.055*** 5.553*** 6.488*** 4.734* -0.205 
 
(3.70) (3.87) (4.48) (3.89) (3.76) (2.31) (-0.06)    
training 7.464*** 8.046*** 6.675*** 8.086*** 6.209*** 16.2 10.43 
 
(4.29) (4.69) (3.99) (4.55) (3.64) (1.96) (1.47)    
match 3.011* 8.564*** 7.187* 9.924*** 12.27*** -17.11**  
 
(2.14) (3.45) (2.06) (3.99) (6.24) (-3.11)  
eng  8.370*** 9.078** 9.308*** 13.06***   
 
 (3.76) (2.68) (4.03) (5.20)   
match_eng       -15.80*** 
 
      (-3.93)    
ldom -7.040*** -6.971***  -6.935***    
 
(-8.05) (-8.30)  (-8.12)    
anglophone 0.200 0.668 -3.236     
 
(0.05) (0.19) (-0.41)     
empl2 6.881* 5.971 -1.246 5.48 -2.472 -4.083 3.081 
 
(2.08) (1.88) (-0.41) (1.73) (-0.78) (-0.49) (0.44)    
empl3 11.74*** 10.96*** -3.618 10.55*** -4.39 -7.415 -3.245 
 
(4.37) (4.15) (-1.39) (3.93) (-1.50) (-1.08) (-1.07)    
empl4 13.84*** 13.54*** -3.226 13.27** -3.908 -9.189 -5.218 
 
(3.30) (3.34) (-1.06) (3.21) (-1.10) (-1.05) (-0.67)    
empl5 19.22*** 18.72*** -0.364 18.43*** -3.705 20.65*** 26.97*** 
 
(4.86) (4.98) (-0.10) (4.86) (-1.02) (13.11) (11.70)    
tradegdp 0.0992*** 0.104*** 0.101** 0.102*** 0.119*** 0.021 0.00884 
 
(5.91) (5.91) (3.16) (5.58) (3.39) (0.19) (0.10)    
sub 10.58*** 9.515*** 7.978*** 8.932*** 8.016*** 0.148 3.27 
 
(6.13) (4.49) (3.80) (4.02) (3.30) (0.02) (0.72)    
DEmkt 5.326* 5.138* 11.97*** 4.415* 10.28*** 10.64 5.53 
 
(2.33) (2.37) (4.77) (2.07) (3.78) (1.63) (1.55)    
USmkt 5.441 6.061 10.66* 5.074 10.16* 16.15 16.89 
 
(1.39) (1.57) (2.53) (1.31) (2.55) (1.08) (1.27)    
agents 1.392                 
 
(0.72)                 
trans 2.792                 
 
(1.38)                 
N 1064 1083 1576 1052 1401 175 204 
r2_w 0.283 0.288 0.116 0.291 0.124 0.261 0.276 
r2_b 0.706 0.695 0.319 0.569 0.386 0.976 0.962 
r2_o 0.333 0.333 0.146 0.325 0.163 0.277 0.286 
chi2 2870.3 1671.2 1317.8 1789.9 3445.3 . .    
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Note : * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001". Industry sector dummies and constants included but not reported. 
Table 5 IV Estimates of Language Effects in Export/Turnover Equations 
Dep. Var. (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) 
Export Ratio     
empnat 63.35***    
 (4.45)    
skills  42.91***   
  (4.96)   
training   53.73***  
   (4.56)  
match    46.05** 
    (3.16) 
sub 9.520** 11.18*** 4.501 9.568** 
 (3.15) (4.35) (1.36) (3.18) 
tradegdp 0.0828*** 0.0639** 0.0915*** 0.0471 
 (3.30) (2.91) (3.59) (1.51) 
Anglophone 0.694 9.999 14.15 -13.82* 
 (0.13) (1.73) (1.95) (-2.14) 
empl2 2.424 3.899 4.524 4.058 
 (0.64) (1.15) (1.21) (1.05) 
empl3 10.55** 12.98*** 3.336 13.04*** 
 (2.95) (4.01) (0.81) (3.65) 
empl4 14.16*** 11.07** 3.859 13.43*** 
 (3.85) (3.12) (0.81) (3.62) 
empl5 17.47*** 13.61*** 6.239 20.71*** 
 (4.51) (3.45) (1.13) (5.37) 
ldom -6.911*** -7.381*** -6.778*** -6.790*** 
 (-10.61) (-11.98) (-9.58) (-9.61) 
USmkt 3.052 3.023 6.853 -13.68 
 (0.77) (0.76) (1.63) (-1.80) 
DEmkt 2.081 0.536 6.488* -2.807 
 (0.70) (0.20) (2.33) (-0.73) 
N 1118 1120 1168 1030 
Instrumented          empnat,                     skills,                        training,                      match 
Excl.exogenous strategy, agents, trans, strategy, agents, trans, web, agents trans, strategy, agents 
Weak id stat 11.12 19.09 13.07 11.91 
Id stat 32.2 52.25 36.79 23.36 
Id pr. 4.76E-07 2.64E-11 5.10E-08 8.45E-06 
Hansen’s J 1.08 2.32 0.476 0.943 
J pr. 0.583 0.313 0.788 0.332 
And.-Rub. F 11.16 11.61 11.75 8.298 
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First Stage (1) (2) (3) (4)    
 skills Training empnat match    
sub 0.0491 0.178*** 0.057 0.0447 
 (1.30) (5.02) (1.60) (1.19) 
tradegdp 0.000895** 0.000155 0.00148*** 0.000357 
 (2.82) (0.48) (1.18) (4.88)    
anglophone -0.330*** -0.323*** -0.0833 0.210*   
 (-6.26) (-5.03) (-1.60) (2.29)    
empl2 0.0469 0.00974 0.0547 0.0505 
 (0.94) (0.20) (1.31) (0.97)    
empl3 0.00351 0.172*** 0.0422 -0.0203 
 (0.08) (3.73) (1.14) (-0.42)    
empl4 0.0973* 0.205*** 0.0232 0.0384 
 (1.98) (4.14) (0.57) (0.75)    
empl5 0.170*** 0.273*** 0.0535 0.0189 
 (3.46) (5.57) (1.28) (0.37)    
ldom 0.0077 -0.00402 -0.000665 -0.00613 
 (0.98) (-0.57) (-0.10) (-0.83)    
USmkt 0.0589 -0.0378 0.038 0.432*** 
 (1.00) (-0.67) (0.75) (15.03)    
DEmkt 0.112** -0.019 0.0551 0.196*** 
 (2.97) (-0.50) (1.54) (5.39)    
strategy 0.183*** 0.0994***  0.141*** 
 (6.19) (3.94)  (4.69)    
agents 0.0851** 0.0704* 0.0776** 0.0367 
 (2.70) (2.30) (2.73) (1.17)    
trans 0.0774** 0.0770** 0.0727**  
 (2.67) (2.70) (2.87)  
web   0.134***  
    (4.26)  
N 1120 1168 1118 1030 
R-sq 0.129 0.138 0.051 0.119 
 
NB: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001". Industry sector dummies and constants included 
but not reported. 
  
30 
 
 
Table 6 Relation between Language Matching and Language Investment: Euro-
pean Anglophone and Non-Anglophone SMEs (Probit) 
 (6.1) (6.2) 
Dep. Var. Match_noneng Match 
 Anglophone Non-Anglophone 
   
Training 0.735* 0.0609 
 
(2.45) (0.89) 
 
  
Skills 1.149*** 0.275*** 
 
(4.03) (3.97) 
 
  
Emp. nat. 
spkr. 0.117 0.165* 
 
(0.30) (2.00) 
 
  
Trade/GDP 0.00241 0.00366*** 
 
(1.12) (4.97) 
 
  
Subsid –0.374 0.0915 
 
(–1.27) (1.02) 
 
  
N 205 1516 
r2_p 0.171 0.0317 
p 0.0000868 1.86e–10 
NB: t statistics in parentheses. Industry sectors and constant included but not reported. 
 
Table 7 Marginal Effects at Mean from Probit Match Equations  
Anglophone dy/dx z Pr. [95% Conf. 
Training 0.1776 2.4600 0.0140 0.0358 0.3193 
Skills 0.2773 3.9200 0.0000 0.1385 0.4162 
Emp.nat. spkr. 0.0283 0.3000 0.7660 –0.1582 0.2148 
Non-Anglophone      
Training 0.0234 0.8900 0.3750 –0.0283 0.0750 
Skills 0.1055 3.9700 0.0000 0.0535 0.1576 
Emp.nat. spkr. 0.0634 2.0000 0.0460 0.0012 0.1255 
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Appendix I: The Konya Model 
 
The model consists of two ‘countries’ with populations � and ͳ − �. Each member of 
these populations provides labour and a demand for differentiated goods. Trading is 
possible for an individual who has learned the other country’s language. It is also pos-
sible if a person in the other country invests in language skills. 
According to the Konya (2006) model, the Nash equilibrium shares of language learn-
ers of the big country (ߙ) and the small country (ߚ) are given by: 
 
   21 11 1L LL L      ;   21 11 1L LL L         (1) 
 � ≡ ln ଵ+�+�ଵ+�  measures the relative importance of language barrier (�) relative to physical barrier (�);  � > Ͳ.5 is the relative size of the big country and ͳ − � is that of the small 
country; 
The optimal shares of language learners considered globally are given by: 
 
   22 1 1 21 4 1L LL L      ;   22 1 2 11 1L LL L         (2) 
For the big country (Figure A1), the optimal share ̃ߙopt is generally greater than the 
equilibrium share αequ—underinvestment in language skills—as long as the relative 
importance of the language barrier is not too high. Anderson and Wincoop (2004) in-
dicate that language costs are about 4 percent of trade costs for industrialised coun-
tries, suggesting substantial large country under-investment. Moreover, the bigger the 
relative size of the bigger country (�), the higher the underinvestment tends to be. 
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Figure A1 Underinvestment of Language Skills for the Big Country 
 
Similarly, the small country (Figure A2) also under-invests in language skills (i.e. βopt>βequ) by more, the greater is the difference in size of the two countries.  
Figure A2 Underinvestment of Language Skills for the Small Country 
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Appendix II: Tables 
 
Table A1 Language Used by SME in Principal Market 
MFL01 Freq. Percent MFL01 Freq. Percent 
Arabic 2 0.11 Italian 65 3.56 
Bulgarian 3 0.16 Japanese 2 0.11 
Chinese 4 0.22 Latvian 1 0.05 
Czech 18 0.99 Lithuanian 2 0.11 
Danish 8 0.44 Norwegian 10 0.55 
Dutch 20 1.09 Polish 21 1.15 
English 874 47.84 Portuguese 24 1.31 
Estonian 4 0.22 Romanian 5 0.27 
Finnish 16 0.88 Russian 145 7.94 
French 164 8.98 Slovakian 26 1.42 
German 279 15.27 Slovenian 1 0.05 
Greek 8 0.44 Spanish 64 3.5 
Hungarian 22 1.2 Swedish 30 1.64 
Icelandic 1 0.05 Turkish 8 0.44 
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Table A2 SME’s Principal Foreign Market 
 Sample %  Sample % 
Australia 0.45 Latin America 1.41 
Austria 2.71 Latvia 1.64 
Belgium 2.83 Lithuania 2.26 
Brazil 0.45 Luxembourg 0.45 
Bulgaria 0.68 Malta 0.11 
Canada 0.28 Middle East 2.09 
China 1.36 Netherlands 3.11 
Czech Rep 2.37 Norway 1.41 
Denmark 2.26 Poland 1.58 
Egypt 0.11 Portugal 1.7 
Estonia 0.96 Romania 1.92 
Finland 1.36 Russia 5.88 
France 9.5 Slovakia 0.96 
Germany 17.07 Slovenia 0.17 
Greece 1.24 South Africa 0.28 
Hungary 1.19 South–East Asia 0.73 
Iceland 0.23 Spain 3.11 
India 0.23 Sweden 1.98 
Ireland 1.07 Turkey 0.68 
Italy 4.35 UK 10.63 
Japan 0.79 USA 6.39 
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Table A3 Trade Openness of European Economies (%) 
 Trade/GDP ratio 2003/5 
Austria 106.9 
Belgium 165.4 
Bulgaria 126.1 
Cyprus 95.8 
Czech 138.6 
Denmark 88.7 
Estonia 165.5 
Finland 74.7 
France 51.9 
Germany 71.3 
Greece 52.9 
Hungary 134.4 
Iceland 78.5 
Ireland 153.4 
Italy 51.5 
Latvia 104 
Lithuania 115.2 
Luxembourg 268.1 
Netherlands 127.7 
Norway 72.4 
Poland 74.3 
Portugal 69.2 
Romania 78.1 
Slovak 158.3 
Spain 55.7 
Sweden 86.9 
Switzerland 94.3 
Turkey 61.1 
UK 55.3 
Source: WTO A31statistics database, trade profiles, http://stat.wto.org/. 
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Table A4 Model Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Pabroad 1814 43.35656 32.68172 0 100 
Turnover 1312 1.76E+007 9.58E+007 0 2.96E+009 
Sub 1944 0.196502 0.397455 0 1 
Tradegdp 1972 105.5822 48.15532 51.5 268.1 
Web 1908 0.601153 0.48979 0 1 
Skills 1934 0.435884 0.496 0 1 
Strategy 1868 0.486081 0.49994 0 1 
Empnat 1937 0.20857 0.406391 0 1 
Agents 1937 0.303046 0.459694 0 1 
Trans 1925 0.428052 0.494925 0 1 
Training 1951 0.484367 0.499884 0 1 
Match 1755 0.621083 0.485256 0 1 
Anglophone 2005 0.107731 0.310117 0 1 
Eng 2005 0.241397 0.428037 0 1 
Match_eng 2005 0.167581 0.373587 0 1 
DEmkt 2005 0.149626 0.356793 0 1 
Sector1 2005 0.041397 0.199255 0 1 
Sector2 2005 0.64788 0.47775 0 1 
Sector3 2005 0.019451 0.13814 0 1 
Sector4 2005 0.092269 0.289478 0 1 
Sector5 2005 0.199003 0.39935 0 1 
Empl1 1963 0.2012226 0.401016 0 1 
Empl2 1963 0.1385634 0.3455784 0 1 
Empl3 1963 0.2343352 0.4236905 0 1 
Empl4 1963 0.1869587 0.3899777 0 1 
Empl5 1963 0.23892 0.4265324 0 1 
 
